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FROM COMPARISON TO 
COLLABORATION: 
EXPERIMENTS WITH A NEW 




In both the anthropology of law and comparative legal studies, the 
comparative paradigm is increasingly eclipsed by a new overarching motif for 
research and practice: collaboration. Examples abound in anthropology, in 
which some of the most sophisticated anthropologists of the contemporary are 
now focusing on new forms of cross-disciplinary collaboration as scholarly 
ventures that displace traditional forms of comparative scholarship.1 In legal 
studies, likewise, collaboration is at once a necessary legal skill to be imparted 
at law schools,2 a new research methodology,3 and a new answer to old legal 
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 1.  See, e.g., FIELDWORK IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO BE: LEARNING ANTHROPOLOGY’S METHOD 
IN A TIME OF TRANSITION (James D. Faubion & George E. Marcus eds., 2009); Douglas R. Holmes & 
George E. Marcus, Collaboration Today and the Re-Imagination of the Classic Scene of Fieldwork 
Encounter, 1 COLLABORATIVE ANTHROPOLOGIES 81 (2008); Joanne Rappaport, Beyond Participant 
Observation: Collaborative Ethnography as Theoretical Innovation, 1 COLLABORATIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGIES 1 (2008); Deepa S. Reddy, Caught in Collaboration, 1 COLLABORATIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGIES 51 (2008); Annelise Riles, Introduction to DOCUMENTS: ARTIFACTS OF MODERN 
KNOWLEDGE 1 (Annelise Riles, ed., 2006). 
 2.  See, e.g., JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE 
BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (2012); Jenny 
Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 
(2012). 
 3.  See, e.g., Eric Chuk et al., Creating Socially Networked Knowledge Through Interdisciplinary 
Collaboration, 11 ARTS & HUMANITIES IN HIGHER EDUC. 93 (2011). 
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problems.4 
These developments in the legal academy mirror a number of quasi-utopian 
initiatives proliferating from the corporate world,5 to the world of NGOs and 
international human rights, to popular culture.6 Whether it is teams of strangers 
working together over long distances to build the latest gadget, or anonymous 
consumers brought together through cell phone applications to share reviews of 
those gadgets, our culture now celebrates collective work outside of traditional 
institutional structures enabled by new forms of Internet-based communication. 
From the academy to the arts, collaborative work is imagined as more creative, 
and more valued, than work produced individually or within institutions.  
Collaboration even holds out the promise of replacing old forms of political and 
social conflict with “win-win scenarios.”7 The image of these projects is one of 
fulfilled, empowered people, in charge of their own destinies, operating without 
the usual burdens of institutional relations (from office politics to unequal 
access to resources). Above all, collaboration is the new answer to seemingly 
intractable social and economic problems. Collaboration is assumed to 
transcend cultural, political and economic divides and thereby to produce new 
kinds of economic and social value. One recent legal commentary epitomizes 
this euphoria: 
The world’s economic and ecological meltdowns demand that we now redesign our 
livelihoods, our enterprises, our communities, our organizations, our food systems, our 
housing and much more. This glorious reinvention has already begun, and many refer 
to it as the “sharing economy,” the “cooperative economy,” the “grassroots 
economy,” or just the “new economy.
8
 
This enthusiasm for collaboration9 coincides with a marked loss of 
 
 4.  See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER. THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods 
and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273 (2004). 
 5.  See Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative Economy, P2P FOUNDATION 51 (Apr. 2012), 
http://p2p.coop/files/reports/collaborative-economy-2012.pdf. 
[C]orporate platforms create the possibility for users to share their own creative work, or what 
they have found, but no common code or knowledge base is created. The platforms are owned 
by corporations, and the attention and behavioral data are sold to advertisers. Regulations 
over these platforms are established by the corporate owners. Apart from generic platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, there are many specialized platforms including 
for creative work that is shared under ‘sharing licenses’ such as the Creative Commons 
licensing scheme. 
Id. at 51. 
 6.  See, e.g., CRAIG WARKENTIN, RESHAPING WORLD POLITICS: NGOS, THE INTERNET, AND 
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY (2001); Jonathan Bach, Link, Search, Interact: The Co-Evolution of NGOs 
and Interactive Technology, 21 THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 101 (2004). 
 7.  See, e.g., HAZEL HENDERSON, BUILDING A WIN-WIN WORLD: LIFE BEYOND GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC WARFARE (1996); Gary Hamel, Yves L Doz and Coimbatore K Prahalad, Collaborate with 
your Competitors and Win, 67 HARV BUS. REV. 133 (1989). 
 8.  Kassan & Orsi, supra note 2. 
 9.  See e.g., IAN CONDRY, THE SOUL OF ANIME: COLLABORATIVE CREATIVITY AND JAPAN’S 
MEDIA SUCCESS STORY (2012); Oihab Allal-Cherif & Maira Salvator, Collaboration as an Anti-Crisis 
Solution: The Role of the Procurement Function, 41 INT’L J. OF PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS 
MGMT 860 (2011); Chris Mahoney, The Collaborative Economy, 15 EXECUTIVE SPEECHES 1 (2001). 
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confidence, and even interest, in comparison.10 As many comparative lawyers 
have commented in recent years, at this very moment of intensive globalization, 
comparative law ironically is a field in decline, if not outright crisis.11 
Yet, despite the loss of excitement around comparison as a lens of legal 
analysis, collaboration, as an alternative, sounds like something of a let-down. 
On the one hand, comparatists and anthropologists have always collaborated 
with their interlocutors in the production of knowledge.12 On the other hand, the 
euphoria about global collaboration as a methodology13 in fields from corporate 
management theory14 to political activism may strike many scholars as 
somewhat shallow and even naïve. Like happiness or health, collaboration 
would seem to be something no one can really be against but about which very 
little can be said. Why and how would collaboration become anything 
specifically meaningful, let alone ethical, for the comparative lawyer? 
As the ubiquity of collaboration as a new form of market activity suggests, 
the wider context for this inquiry is a new configuration of global market 
relations and their political implications. The emergence of a “new economy” 
requires that comparative lawyers ask new questions about their role—what is 
the value of scholarly interventions in this particular political and economic 
climate? What kind of response does this emerging economy demand? What 
opportunities does it present for the kind of progressive, cosmopolitan legal 
agenda that has long animated comparative law? 
This article responds to the emergence of collaboration as a template for 
social and political life in a particular way. In part II, it describes the ubiquity of 
collaboration as an emerging modality of economic and legal organization as a 
response to an epistemological crisis—a loss of faith in expertise after the 
demonstrated failure of existing paradigms of market activity and regulation. 
 
 10.  See e,g., Symposium, New Approaches to Comparative Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997); 
James Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 607 (1998); Ugo Mattei 
& Mathias Reimann, Introduction to Symposium, New Directions in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 597 (1998). 
 11.  See Annelise Riles, Introduction: The Projects of Comparison, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1, 2–3 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) (describing “a certain ubiquitous angst about 
the disciplinary identity of comparative law today—a lingering question about what makes comparative 
law unique vis-à-vis other academic disciplines, form the anthropology or sociology of law to 
comparative politics, or jurisprudence, and a sense of being at a loss about the way forward”). 
 12.  See, e.g., LUKE LASSITER, THE CHICAGO GUIDE TO COLLABORATIVE ETHNOGRAPHY 
(2005); Kiven Strohm, When Anthropology Meets Contemporary Art: Notes for a Politics of 
Collaboration, 5 COLLABORATIVE ANTHROPOLOGIES 98, 98 (2012). 
 13.  See, e.g., Oihab Allal-Chérif & Salvator Maira, Collaboration as an Anti-Crisis Solution: the 
Role of the Procurement Function, 41 INT’L J. PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 860 
(2011); Morten T. Hansen & Nitin Nohria, How to Build Collaborative Advantage, 46 MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV. (Fall 2004); Stephen Kelly, The Function and Character of Relationship Benefits: 
Transferring Capabilities and Resources to the Small Firm, 14 J. SMALL BUS. & ENTERPRISE DEV. 602 
(2007). 
 14.  See, e.g., Ron Basu, New Criteria of Performance Management: A Transition From Enterprise to 
Collaborative Supply Chain, 5 MEASURING BUS. EXCELLENCE., no. 4, 2001, at 7; Hansen & Nohria, 
supra note 13, at 22; Chris Mahoney, Sr., The Collaborative Economy, 15 EXECUTIVE SPEECHES, 
Apr./May 2001, at 1. 
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Part III then turns to the scholarly implications of the rise of the collaborative 
economy. It contrasts collaboration with an earlier logic of comparison and 
accounts for the demise of the latter and the rise of the former in terms of their 
relationship to changing economic forms. Part IV then addresses the key 
question of how comparative law as a discipline, and progressive cosmopolitan 
scholars as committed individuals, might respond to these developments. This 
part engages with developments within anthropology, and particularly feminist 
anthropology, as a source of inspiration. Part V works through these claims in 
concrete terms through the example of a collaborative project in engaged 
comparative law I am directing, known as Meridian 180.15 Part VI concludes 
with one insight from the Meridian 180 experiment: the central problem of 
interest in things unfamiliar or foreign, and how it is generated in this sharing 
economy. This new focus on interest and disinterest in things foreign in turn 
illuminates the linkages of the kinds of new projects I advocate here for the 
tradition of comparative law. It also enables us to see exactly how a new kind of 
comparative law might respond to the transformations of the collaborative 
economy. 
II 
THE COLLABORATION ECONOMY 
From Airbnb,16 the online service that allows ordinary individuals to rent out 
their homes for the night, to travelers who seek to bypass the hotel chains, to 
Uber,17 a service that links up people wishing to make extra money as drivers 
with those seeking a ride, the corporate world is full of examples of new 
economic collaborations among strangers outside the usual economic structures. 
Enabled by information technologies, these new economic collaborations claim 
a certain ethos of friendliness that is slightly more personalized than the 
ordinary financial transaction. Likewise, the most exciting innovations in policy 
turn on collaboration of various kinds,18 from public–private partnerships19 and 
 
 15.  See generally MERIDIAN 180, http://www.meridian-180.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
 16.  See e.g., Kurt Matzler, Viktoria Veider & Wolfgang Kathan, Adapting to the Sharing Economy, 
56 MIT SLOAN MGMT REV. 71 (Winter 2015) (“Well-known examples of successful startups built on 
collaborative consumption systems include Airbnb Inc., a San Francisco-based online accommodations 
marketplace, and Zipcar, a car-sharing brand that is now part of the vehicle rental services company 
Avis Budget Group Inc., based in Parsippany, New Jersey.”). 
 17.  See e.g., Pierre-Dimitri Gore-Coty, How Uber is Revving Up European Consumer Choice, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sep. 17, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-uber-is-revving-up-european-
consumer-choice-1410979717. 
 18.  See Bronwen Morgan & Declan Kuch, Activism, Sustainability and the Sharing Economy, 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
The “sharing economy” has risen to prominence in recent years as recession, outsourcing, 
environmental depletion and alienation drive workers and consumers into new forms of 
economic action. . .Narrower understandings [of the “sharing economy”] focus on ways in 
which information technology is used to empower individuals or organisations to distribute, 
share and re-use excess capacity in goods and services. We would, however, situate the sharing 
economy on a spectrum “between activism and enterprise,” with the intention of unsettling 
what might otherwise be seen as an intuitively dichotomous relationship between these two 
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crowdsourcing,20 to “peer review” as a norm-generating tool and an alternative 
to legal enforcement.21 Often these collaborations are self-consciously 
transnational: they aim to break down barriers of locality and allow, say, a 
foreigner arriving in an unfamiliar city to stay in an individual’s home as if they 
were friends,22 or again, European polic makers to transcend national conflicts 
over the implementation of European Union (EU) directives and to work 
together in a more constructive way.23 
It will not surprise anthropologists and comparative lawyers that these 
transnational collaborations face tremendous technical and political 
challenges.24 Indeed, Uber and Airbnb have become extreme examples of the 
possible abuses of the collaboration model.25 Yet, in more routine forms of 
collaboration, between, say, workers located in different places, within different 
institutional settings, this form of engagement turns out to be hard to do. In 
response, an entire industry of collaboration management consultants has 
popped up to solve these difficulties.26 And yet, the faith remains. As two 
 
sets of practices. 
Id. 
 19.  See Christine Harrington & Z. Umut Turem, Accounting for Accountability in Neoliberal 
Tegulatory Regimes, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 195 (2006) 
(critiquing the fantasy that public–private partnerships can better solve policy problems). 
 20.  See, e.g., JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING : WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE 
FUTURE OF BUSINESS (1st paperback ed. 2009); Daren C. Brabhamm, Crowdsourcing as a Model for 
Problem Solving: An Introduction and Cases, 14 CONVERGENCE 75 (2008). 
 21.  See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning From Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008); Michael Wilkinson, 
Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 673 (2010); cf. Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in 
International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083 (2011) (critiquing the limitations of peer 
review as a regulatory method); Annelise Riles, Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global 
Financial Regulation?, MONETARY & ECONOMIC STUDIES 65 (Nov. 2013) (“Comparative research in 
other fields suggests that [new governance] methods are most effective when the problem they seek to 
address is very narrowly tailored. In such cases, peer review can be more focused, and discussions in 
supervisory colleges can be more specific and meaningful.”). 
 22.  See, e.g., Stuart Miller, A Crash Course in Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/travel/a-crash-course-in-airbnb.html?_r=0. 
 23.  See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, supra note 21. 
 24.  See, e.g., Ruth Buchanan & Sundhya Pahuja, Collaboration, Cosmopolitanism and Complicity, 
71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 297 (2002) (describing the challenges of collaboration among international legal 
academics in the Global North and the Global South). 
 25.  See, e.g., Ellen Barry & Suhasini Raj, Uber Banned in India’s Capital After Rape Accusation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/world/asia/new-delhi-bans-uber-after-
driver-is-accused-of-rape.html; Lisa Fleisher, Uber Shuts Down in Spain After Telecos Block Access to 
App, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 31, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/12/31/uber-shuts-down-
in-spain-after-telcos-block-access-to-its-app/; Michael Stothard, Paris Plans UberPop Ban Amid Taxi 
Protest, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f9bcc7e-8438-11e4-bae9-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RB1hM100. 
 26.  See, e.g., CHRISTIAN MADSBJERG & MIKKEL RASMUSSEN, THE MOMENT OF CLARITY: 
USING THE HUMAN SCIENCES TO SOLVE YOUR TOUGHEST BUSINESS PROBLEMS (2014); Graeme 
Wood, Anthropology Inc., THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:09 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2013/03/anthropology-inc/309218/. 
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commentators in the Harvard Business Review blog recently put it, in the 
corporate world, collaboration is “at risk of simply becoming a new form of 
‘greenwashing.’”27 
What defines collaboration? In the management consultancy language, 
collaboration must be some form of collective activity directed towards a well-
defined purpose. Every partner to the collaboration must understand his own 
relationship to this purpose, and a focus on this purpose gives the collaboration 
energy and form. This kind of goal-oriented collaboration makes foreignness 
comfortable since all differences align towards a common goal. Total strangers 
working outside of any formal instrumental structure except for the confines of 
the Airbnb application and the limited rules it establishes for users can work 
together to rent an apartment for the night as long as they share this clear 
purpose. Thus, in this view, collaboration that has no purpose is nonsense. Here, 
if you do not share a common goal, it must not be collaboration. As University 
of California, Berkeley management professor Morton Hansen puts it, 
collaboration without a purpose is “bad collaboration,” and “[b]ad collaboration 
is worse than no collaboration.”28 
In a recent catalog of emerging forms of Internet-based participation, a 
group of science and technology studies–inflected scholars have proposed that 
we understand such projects by focusing on the concept of social and economic 
value.29 Every such project, no matter how novel or diverse, has some concept of 
value, they argue, and we can gain clarity about these projects by asking what 
value is for each. For example, in the Airbnb case, the transaction produces 
economic value for both sides (rent for the property owner and savings relative 
to the price of a hotel for the renter) and there might also be additional forms 
of cultural or social value attached to getting to know a stranger or living like a 
local by staying in someone’s home. Value for these scholars is some output that 
can only be created through the collaborative exercise. One can thus empirically 
observe what value is through the project’s definition of its own goals, legal 
responsibility, execution of assignments, resource management, and so on.30 
Although the authors are trained in informatics, computer science, and the 
social studies of technology, they argue that, despite the new technologies 
usually involved, these collaborations are actually best understood by asking 
conventional questions in the sociology of institutions—how is authority 
defined and exercised, what counts as valuable output, and what are the rights 
and obligations of institutional participants, for example.31 
 
 27.  Paul Ellingstad & Charmian Love, Is Collaboration the New Greenwashing?, HBR BLOG 
NETWORK (Mar. 12, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/03/is-collaboration-the-new-green-
1/http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/03/is-collaboration-the-new-green-1/. 
 28.  MORTEN HANSEN, COLLABORATION: HOW LEADERS AVOID THE TRAPS, BUILD COMMON 
GROUND, AND REAP BIG RESULTS. (2013). 
 29.  See Adam Fish, Luis F.R. Murillo, Lilly Nguyen, Aaron Panofsky & Christopher M. Kelty, 
Birds of the Internet, 4 J. CULTURAL ECON. 157, 167 (2011). 
 30.  See id. at 168. 
 31.  See id. at 161 (following Weber’s sociology of organizations). 
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The authors’ understanding of value correlates closely with the emphasis on 
instrumental purpose as the core identity and legitimizing function of 
collaborations in the celebrations in management studies of the collaborative 
economy, described above. Yet the shift from a management discourse of 
purpose to an economic language of value leads us to think about collaboration 
as a market form. It leads us to ask a question that they do not ask: why the 
collaborative economy now? What does the emergence of collaboration as a 
template for social and political life, as well as market activity, tell us about the 
nature of the present moment? 
The common story is an optimistic one—we are simply discovering new and 
better ways of doing things. Here, collaboration represents an innovation on 
other outmoded forms of social and economic organization. This optimistic 
story is sometimes infused with a certain tone of desperation, as in the claim 
that new collaborative ventures may offer a source of livelihood for people in a 
situation in which traditional jobs are disappearing with no prospect for their 
return.32 Yet there may also be a darker explanation. As I have argued elsewhere 
based on fieldwork among regulators of the global economy,33 in the post-
financial-crisis era, politicians, publics, and financiers have increasingly lost faith 
in the neoliberal vision of market-coordinated societies, institutions, nations, and 
individuals.34 The market no longer is the obvious answer to social problems. At 
the same time, however, in the aftermath of the devastating critiques of the 
legitimacy of state action and the abandonment of any illusion that technocratic 
policymaking is a science immune from politics, the technocrats who inhabit 
state institutions lack confidence in both the efficacy and legitimacy of their 
own judgments. The state does not have all the answers either. This condition 
corresponds more generally to a crisis in expertise—a sense among all 
stakeholders that the experts cannot really be trusted and that they don’t really 
know what they are doing.35 The public and the experts have increasingly lost 
faith in the old “hierarchy of knowledge”36 in which experts could be trusted to 
 
 32.  See Kassan & Orsi, supra note 2, at 6 (describing collaboration as a way to “shift away from 
our reliance on jobs” in a “post-jobs economy”). 
 33.  See Annelise Riles, Market Collaboration: Finance, Culture, and Ethnography After 
Neoliberalism, 115 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555 (2013). 
 34.  See, e.g., Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of an Era in International Financial 
Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda, 65 INT’L ORG. 169 (2011); cf. Susan Hyatt, What was 
Neoliberalism and What Comes Next?, in POLICY WORLDS: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF 
CONTEMPORARY POWER 105 (Cris Shore, Susan Wright & Davide Pero eds. 2012). 
 35.  See DOUGLAS HOLMES, ECONOMY OF WORDS: COMMUNICATIVE IMPERATIVES IN 
CENTRAL BANKS 7 (2014) (quoting Claudio Borio, deputy head of the Monetary and Economic 
department and direct of research and statistics at the Bank of International Settlements (BIS): “The 
crisis has shaken the foundations of the deceptively comfortable central banking world . . . . Postcrisis, 
many certainties have gone. Price stability has proven no guarantee against major financial and 
macroeconomic instability”); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS 
POLICYMAKERS (1998); ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011). 
 36.  See ULRICH BECK, WORLD AT RISK 33 (2009) (describing assumptions about the superiority 
of the expert over ordinary ways of knowing). 
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know best. 
Under such conditions, those in charge are understandably eager to 
“collaborate”—to share the responsibility and the burden of knowing how 
things work or how to get the job done—if only to insulate themselves from 
criticism, if not in hopes that “the wisdom of crowds”37 might be better than 
their own. When government regulators no longer have the confidence that they 
can build institutions that will bolster a well-functioning market, they may turn 
to public–private partnerships as a kind of alternative to rule-making and 
planning.38 When corporations lose confidence in the ability of market 
mechanisms to deliver a stable global production chain based on long-term 
labor relations, they may turn to crowdsourcing as an “anti-crisis solution.”39 
When individuals lose confidence in their own judgment about what product, or 
flavor of ice cream, or law school is best for them, they may turn to 
collaboratively crowdsourced rankings to tell them what they should think.  
From this point of view, although collaboration is often celebrated as a means of 
democratizing the tools of entrepreneurship—turning each of us into a potential 
landlord, or cellphone application inventor, or investor, or political activist—it 
can also be seen as symptomatic of a certain abdication of the spirit of both 
entrepreneurship and economic planning. 
Yet whatever critiques of collaboration we might have seem somewhat 
beside the point: the train has already left the station. Collaboration is 
everywhere in the economy and in wider culture. From primary school ethics to 
scholarly projects, it is the right answer at the moment (who would dare to be 
against collaborating?) This includes the academy. In the next part, I turn to the 
specific implications of the rise of collaboration in law schools for how legal 
scholarship manages globalization and the transnational nature of law—
problems once predominantly the province of comparative law. 
III 
FROM COMPARISON TO COLLABORATION IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES 
The developments described in the previous part are already profoundly 
affecting the legal academy. Law schools everywhere are rushing to teach young 
lawyers how to collaborate effectively in their practice: collaboration has 
become a necessary professional skill.40 The collaborative economy has also 
been heralded as a possible source of legal employment at a time when there 
 
 37.  See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005). 
 38.  See, e.g., Harrington & Turem, supra note 19 (2006). 
 39.  Oihab Allal-Che´rif & Salvator Maira, Collaboration as an Anti-Crisis Solution: The Role of the 
Procurement Function, 41 INT’L J OF PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT 860 (2011). 
 40.  See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, Achieving International Cooperation: NYU’s Global Law School 
Program, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2001) (on the conception of the New York University’s Global Law 
School Program and its mission to attract foreign students in support of a “globalized” collaborative 
university setting). 
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are fewer jobs for lawyers representing large corporate clients.41 But, at a more 
general level, collaboration is en vogue: from collaborative teaching across 
national boundaries, to collaborative research methodologies, to law review 
articles that trumpet collaboration as a social good and evaluate legal doctrines 
in terms of their ability to promote collaboration, it is something that everyone 
seems to do. 
This push for transnational collaboration also correlates with a declining 
enthusiasm for comparative scholarship.42 Who needs to read a scholarly 
comparison of legal institutions in India and the United States when one can 
simply incorporate an Indian legal thinker into one’s project collaboratively?43 
The excitement is no longer about being cosmopolitan; it is about building 
collaborative relationships that displace the need for cosmopolitanism 
altogether. Foreignness itself is obviated by the framework of collaboration, and 
with it, the need for comparison. 
Increasingly, there is a view that, in order to understand what one needs to 
know about foreign law, there is no need for fine-grained comparative 
descriptions—one can simply use a web search engine to consult a collectively 
produced online database.44 In a world in which everyone is an expert of a kind, 
and solutions are produced through various degrees of crowdsourcing rather 
than through scholarly knowledge work, there is increasingly little need for 
comparative legal expertise. 
In fact, the challenge is not unique to comparative law. One important 
dimension of collaboration is that it enrolls citizens, consumers, and workers in 
 
 41.  See, e.g., Reena SenGupta, Alliances Shift Up a Gear, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/665912e2-2a3c-11e3-9bc6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3RHdAyQd5. 
 42.  See ROY WAGNER, LETHAL SPEECH: DARIBI MYTH AS SYMBOLIC OBVIATION (1978) (on 
obviation as the processual form of trope). 
 43.  An example of this impulse is the movement away from citations to comparative legal 
scholarship in court opinions at the same time as a rise in study tours for judges and the growth of 
international associations for judges of different countries.  See generally Kenneth Anderson, Through 
Our Glass Darkly: Does Comparative Law Counsel the Use of Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional 
Adjudication?, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 115, 116 (2014) (“[A] distinct intellectual climate had taken hold, 
particularly among influential academic legal elites as well as some U.S. Supreme Court Justices, that 
foreign law ought to have a role to play—perhaps a significant one—in the interpretation and 
adjudication of U.S. constitutional questions”). On initiatives, such as the Intensive Study Program, 
that support study tours for judges and the growth of international associations for judges of different 
countries, see Muhammad Amir Munir, South Asian Chapter of CJEI—A Blueprint for Establishing a 
Regional Judicial Education Body in South Asia, LAW AND JUSTICE COMMISSION OF 
PAKISTAN/NATIONAL JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING COMMITTEE, SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN, 
ISLAMABAD 1 (2012). 
The CJEI has taught us not only to share information and experiences, but also to inculcate 
good relations at personal level with judges, magistrates and judicial educators of other 
jurisdictions. It brings judiciaries nearer to each other and allows the institution of judiciary in 
each jurisdiction to seek input from other relevant judiciary whenever required and wherever 
relevant. 
Id. 
 44.  See, e.g., Legal Information Institute, Who We Are, (Feb 9, 2014),  
http://www.law.cornell.edu/lii/about/ who_we_are. 
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autointerpretation.45 Collaboration is premised on the assumption that anyone 
and everyone can potentially join in the collaboration. And what this group 
produces will make sense on its own—it will not need further expert analysis. 
For example, a company need no longer use marketing experts to predict 
consumers’ desires if they can rely on vast data collection about consumer 
behavior through cell phone applications and frequent consumer surveys to get 
the aggregate consumer to interpret for herself what she wants. The model here 
is crowdsourcing: one needs no special expertise in order to feed oneself into 
the process of knowledge production. The best expert is the aggregate of the 
ordinary individual. 
As collaboration displaces scholarly expertise more broadly, the legal 
academy is increasingly left without an overt role in either the training of 
lawyers or the production of valuable knowledge about the law. No wonder 
there is so much talk of the fact that legal education does not provide value for 
money46 or that scholarly articles are boring or irrelevant compared to blog 
posts.47 What is perceived as most needed in such a condition (although 
academics are by no means the only or even the best suited providers) are not 
comparative analyses of the law per se but methods for collaborating across 
legal jurisdictions and professions. 
Note that a collaboration in this view is something that has a kind of dual 
nature: it is both a description (an output such as an “objective” evaluation of a 
consumer product) and an institution (such as the community of people who 
come together to produce that evaluation). In other words, it crosses what were 
once different scales of social life—the social “realities” out there and the 
descriptions of those realities someone (such as an expert comparatist) might 
produce. The effect is that what were once two different spheres of activity—the 
descriptive (the province of the academy) and the institutional (the so-called 
“real world”)—have collapsed into one another. We will return to this point in 
the next part. 
In order to understand why and how collaboration displaces comparison as 
a dominant template for legal thought, as well as how comparative lawyers 
 
 45.  See Annelise Riles, Market Collaboration: Finance, Culture, and Ethnography After 
Neoliberalism, 115 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 562 (2013). 
 46.  See, e.g., Sean Patrick Farrel, The Lawyer’s Apprentice: How to Learn the Law Without Law 
School, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/education/ edlife/how-to-learn-
the-law-without-law-school.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=Moth-
Visible&module=inside-nyt-region&region=inside-nyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region; Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Debating, Yet Again, the Worth of Law School, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/18/debating-yet-again-the-worth-of-law-school/. 
 47.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Reviews that Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html?_r=1&; Adam 
Wagner, Making Law Accessible to the Public, THE GUARDIAN, July 26, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jul/26/tort-law-access-legal-aid; John Schwartz. This is Law 
School? Socrates Takes a Back Seat to Business and Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/education/edlife/socrates-takes-a-back-seat-to-business-and-
tech.html. 
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might respond to the current moment, it is necessary to look more carefully at 
what collaboration displaces—comparison. How did comparison work? And 
why was it so successful in its time? 
A. What Was Comparison? Science, Professional Training, and Policy 
Relevance in Legal Scholarship 
For many years, one of the most fundamental problems of legal thought was 
comparison48—the challenge of understanding the foreign. This colossal 
intellectual project demanded a range of sophisticated methodological debates 
about how best to understand and describe the foreign, from fieldwork to 
functionalist analysis. It encompassed philosophical questions on whether an 
understanding and proper description of things foreign was indeed possible, and 
debates about how various theories of translation, fiction, and the like might 
step in to overcome the inherent challenges. It produced an expansive archive of 
knowledge of foreign law and many debates about the preferability or cross-
cultural viability of certain legal techniques over others. And of course it 
produced a cadre of trained comparatists, in conversation with one another 
through disciplinary associations, journals, and research travel on the human 
and institutional relationships that made such understanding of foreignness 
meaningful.49 A key problem, in other words, was making sense of the foreign in 
terms of the familiar and vice versa. 
Postwar comparative law was championed by cosmopolitan émigrés aiming 
to build the legal institutions and intellectual paradigms that would prevent 
another world war. In the generation that followed, these scholars found a 
practical niche in state building and legal reform projects that accompanied 
decolonization and development. In this venture, comparative law drew 
scholarly vitality from a vibrant interdisciplinary conversation with legal 
anthropology.50 
This comparative project turned on a subtle and implicit relational economy 
of three passions, three commitments, three forms of raison d’être. First, 
comparative law had to stake a claim for itself as scholarship (as “legal 
science”).51 Comparatists solidified their project, politically speaking, by 
 
 48.  See, e.g., JOHN L. COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES: THE CULTURAL 
LOGIC OF DISPUTE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT (1981). 
 49.  See TIMOTHY CHOY, ECOLOGIES OF COMPARISON: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF 
ENDANGERMENT IN HONG KONG (2011); MARILYN STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS 51–53 
(Updated ed., Rowman & Littlefield 2004) (1991) (describing the aesthetic devices used by modern 
Euro-Americans for making sense of difference, such as relations of text to context and parts to whole); 
MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFT: PROBLEMS WITH WOMEN AND PROBLEMS WITH 
SOCIETY IN MELANESIA 340–44 (1988) (describing how modernist anthropology makes sense of the 
foreign by decontextualizing local constructs and recontextualizing these in analytical frameworks). 
 50.  See Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 775 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006). 
 51.  See Annelise Riles, Introduction: The Projects of Comparison,  supra note 11, at 8–10 (Annelise 
Riles ed., 2001). 
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grounding it in functionalist social science.52 The relationship to an equally 
functionalist anthropology gave comparative law academic respectability, 
scholarly credentials.53 Here, the joint emphasis of ethnographers and 
comparative lawyers was on the techniques of serious academic comparison: in 
this modernist proto-scientific methodology, empirical data and theory were 
distinct enterprises. Research took place in one initial time period (we might 
call it T-1), and generated data. Then, in a later time period (we might call it T-
2), the data was removed to an intellectual context in which one generated 
analysis.54 Engagement with one’s intellectual peers presumed a basis for 
familiarity—a shared theory of law, a shared epistemology, even a shared 
political agenda—which one did not share with the foreign subjects about whom 
one wrote. 
It should be noted that there was always one problem with the comparative 
lawyer’s appropriation of anthropology. The problem was comparison. 
Comparative lawyers liked big broad comparisons—they wrote books about the 
functional similarities and differences between civil law regimes and common 
law regimes,55 for example, or about the functions of legal transplants in all 
societies and all historical periods.56 Functionalist anthropologists in contrast 
emphasized social context and hence for the most part refused such broad 
 
 52.  See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 381 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., 2006) (“[L]aw is a 
normative discipline for which teleology may be useful or even necessary. Of course, this requires the 
construction of a more robust functional method.”). 
 53.  See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 15 (1930) (quoting Malinowski on 
how the paternal figure and law mirror one another as social principles of legitimate power); JEROME 
HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 104, 105 (1963) (analyzing functionalism and its ties 
to twentieth-century jurisprudence and anthropology); M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 11–12 (1975). 
[T]he information adduced in ethnographic description is collected on the basis of sociological 
theory, and the problem, as already indicated, is the relation between this and the generality 
of theory of and about law. We might well expect tensions between anthropology and 
jurisprudence on this point, but even within the generality of sociological theory there are 
wide areas of disagreement. Perhaps we can illustrate an aspect of this by referring to a 
current dispute in the ethnography of law, on the question of what constitutes a suitable 
language for legal description. This is usually discussed in the context of the work of 
Bohannan and Gluckman, where the former is said to be unwilling to use non-native 
categories of legal thought but the latter, while agreeing that these must be fully explicated, 
prefers the use of Western categories not only for purposes of understanding but also for 
comparative study. 
Id. 
 54.   See STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS, supra note 49, at 17–18 (“Anthropological 
exegesis must be taken for what it is: an effort to create a world parallel to the perceived world in an 
expressive medium (writing) that sets down its own conditions of intelligibility. The creativity of the 
written language is thus both resource and limitation.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATINA AMERICA (3d ed. Stanford, 2007). 
 56.  See e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(1993); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergences, 61 MODERN LAW REVIEW 11 (1998). 
RILES_FORMATTED_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED_CORRECTIONS (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2015  1:42 PM 
Nos. 1 & 2 2015] FROM COMPARISON TO COLLABORATION 159 
comparisons on the theory that one could say very little about “the civil law” in 
general without a deep contextual analysis of its uses, meanings and applications 
in each locale.57 
Second, comparative law had to claim a contribution to professional 
training—to the molding of law as a practice. Comparative lawyers argued 
forcefully that comparative analysis was crucial to skillful legal practice—
whether by lawyers, bureaucrats, or judges—when confronted with disputes with 
cross-cultural dimensions.58 
Third, comparative law had to show that its insights could contribute to the 
needs of policymakers like colonial administrators, UN officials, national 
bureaucrats, law reformers, or judges facing new legal problems.59 Comparative 
lawyers firmly maintained that comparative knowledge was relevant to projects 
like designing new legal institutions in the developing world or negotiating 
trade agreements among developed nations. 
The legitimacy and excitement of comparison, as a project, inhered in the 
way these three very different kinds of raison d’être—science, professional 
training, and policy relevance—subtly coexisted and remained in mutual play. 
For example, the study of legal pluralism was not only a serious scholarly 
project with scientific ties to legal anthropology,60 but also one that contributed 
 
 57.  See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to 
Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographic Resources, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 11 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler, eds., 1986). 
 58.  See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, What May We Expect From Comparative Law?, 22 A.B.A. J. 56, 59 
(1936) (“We can get something for the purposes of today from comparison of rules of law as we find 
them in different systems, chiefly in that such comparison teaches us to be slow in assuming that there is 
but one necessary and inevitable rule of law possible for one given state of facts.”). For a more recent 
formulation, see George A. Bermann, The Discipline of Comparative Law in the United States, 51 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 1041 (1999); George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as 
a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 690 (1998) (“[T]he study and teaching of law as an 
academic subject would seem to cry out for the broadest perspective possible. That perspective would 
seem to come from understanding the way in which law develops and functions in legal cultures other 
than our own.”). See also JOHN H. WIGMORE, KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICE: CONTAINING AUTHENTIC 
ACCOUNTS OF TRIAL SCENES FROM ALL TIMES AND CLIMES vi (1941) (“[I]n any study of our own 
present-day methods, it may help us to have in mind the extraordinary variety of ways in which the 
same objective of Humanity has been sought throughout all times and climes.”). 
 59.  See, e.g., RENÉ DAVID, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARÉ: INTRODUCTION 
A L’ÉTUDE DES DROITS ÉTRANGERS ET A LA MÉTHODE COMPARATIVE 3 (1950); KONRAD 
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (Tony Weir, trans, Oxford 
Univ. Press 3d. rev. ed. 1987). 
Everyone has now come to realize that the law must protect the customer against standard 
terms of business which unfairly affect his rights and liabilities. . . But only in the last twenty 
years have lawyers fully realized that protection against standard terms of business is a general 
problem which in principle affects all contracts. 
Id. 
 60.  See, e.g., HOOKER supra note 53, at 53–54 (1975). Hooker writes: 
The essential lesson taught us by legal ethnography is that comparative study is an exercise in 
jurisprudential exploration which has a twofold task. First, to describe the ways in which 
ethnographic fact and its resulting sociological categories are descriptive of legal phenomena 
which we have otherwise known of for some centuries as obligation, liability, or right. Second, 
we have to determine the proper categories for study within the legal process itself, and legal 
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to colonial and postcolonial law and development projects.61 It was also a kind 
of ethical and professional practice that, once taught, made lawyers or judges 
more sensitive to the needs and perspectives of their constituents and therefore 
better able to perform their tasks. 
The decline of comparative law in the legal academy62 over the last twenty 
years is perhaps related to the way comparatists found themselves pulled in 
different directions by these different wagers. Today, some comparatists 
gravitate towards the scholarly side,63 others towards practical, policy-relevant 
work.64 The moment at which one was able to energetically argue for the 
inseparability of these three dimensions of comparison seems to have passed. 
B. Adventure and Challenge in Legal Scholarship 
Yet what motivated the greatest comparatists was often something subtly 
different. These individuals had a taste for the cosmopolitan adventure.65 And 
although comparative lawyers had perfected arguments for their discipline’s 
indispensability, the meaning of the work for the individuals involved was often 
elsewhere in the intellectual community they brought into being around the 
work, and in more elusive, less concrete forms of impact—enriched lives, 
broadened perspectives, or a strongly felt sense of cause.66 In the heady days of 
comparison, the triad of science, professional training, and policy relevance 
often masked another version of itself—intellectual adventure, vocation, and 
political action. 
Consider, for example, the career of Masaji Chiba, the venerable Japanese 
 
ethnography has demonstrated for us the primacy of process and determined its boundaries in 
respect of certain special systems. 
Id. See also Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Jurisprudence of Schlesinger and Sacco, in RETHINKING THE 
MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 11, at 243. 
 61.  See, e.g., PETER FITZPATRICK, LAW AND STATE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA (1980). 
 62.  See, e.g., George A. Bermann, The Discipline of Comparative Law in the United States, 51 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 1041 (1999); Ugo Mattei & Mathias Reimann, 
Introduction to Symposium, New Directions in Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 597 (1998); P.G. 
Monateri, “Everybody’s Talking”: The Future of Comparative Law, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 825 (1998); Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. 
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 49 (1996). 
 63.  See, e.g., LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING 
PERSONS AND THINGS (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2004). 
 64.  See, e.g., Hannibal B. Travis, President Obama’s “Pivot” to Jobs: Lessons from Comparative 
Law and America’s Rivals, 3 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2002). 
 65.  See Annelise Riles, Encountering Amateurism: John Henry Wigmore and the Use of American 
Formalism, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 11, at 94. 
 66.  See Annelise Riles, Introduction, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
supra note 11, at 6. 
They actively campaign[ed] to become a part of the mainstream academy and its curriculum. 
Both academics and amateurs, at times political radicals and at others conservative, figures 
caught between familiar and distant legal worlds, these comparativists seem defined by a 
constant task of translation—to themselves as much as to others. 
Id. 
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legal pluralist,67 and vociferous critic of comparative law’s Eurocentric focus.68 
Chiba chastised Euro-American legal pluralists such as M.B. Hooker69 for 
remaining too bound to Western jurisprudential categories even as they 
emphasized pluralism.70 He emphasized rather the cultural particularity of 
Western law, and especially the culturally specific Western practice of claiming 
for its categories universality.71 His history of the Japanese absorption of 
Western legal ideas and of the coexistence of these with Japanese customary 
law72 provided a reflexive perspective on legal transplants at a moment of 
obsessive transplantation from the West after the end of the Second World War. 
The starting premise of Chiba’s comparative legal work was the simple 
functionalist anthropological insight that what counts as law, or should count as 
law, may be radically different in different contexts.73 For example, in his work 
on contract law, Chiba began with an odd question: Why do Japanese people 
work hard?74 His answer, based on interviews and observation, as well as legal 
analysis, was that the indefiniteness of Japanese contract law was supplemented 
 
 67.  See, e.g., MASAJI CHIBA. LEGAL PLURALISM: TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY THROUGH 
JAPANESE LEGAL CULTURE (1989). 
 68.  See, e.g., RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 4 (3d. ed., Steven & Sons 1985) 
(1964). 
 69.  See CHIBA, supra note 67, at 38–39. 
The notion of “legal pluralism” came to be thus used in consideration of cultural pluralism in 
law, which was most persuasively discussed by M.B. Hooker. In his book in 1975, Hooker 
clearly pushed forward the idea of cultural pluralism in the law of non-Western countries. . . . 
Western jurisprudence came to recognize the necessity to pay due respect for other systems of 
law culturally different from Western law. This would be without doubt a remarkable 
milestone in the history of Western jurisprudence. At the same time, a new question arises: 
Can Western jurisprudence truly appreciate non-Western legal situations? We are here 
required to examine the cultural character of jurisprudence as understood by the Western as 
well as the non-Western scholars. 
Id. 
 70.  See Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism in Sri Lankan Society: Toward a General Theory of Non-
Western Law, 33 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 197, 198 (1993) (“Their empirical method was truly different 
from the normative one of the orthodox jurisprudence, but the perspectives of both disciplines were not 
so different in that they had the tendency to isolate law from the rest of the total culture in society.”). 
 71.  See CHIBA, supra note 67, at 4 (“[L]egal pluralism must be questioned and discussed not 
limited to non-Western society but extended to Western society as well. At present, most of those who 
know the word and facts of legal pluralism seem to understand it as a special phenomenon in non-
Western society.”). 
 72.  See id. at 131, 153 (describing his “Three-Level-Structure of Law” model of Western law and 
expanding its conception and application to account for the interactions of transplanted “modern” law 
and “indigenous” law in non-Western situations such as Japan). 
 73.  See Chiba, supra note 70, at 199. 
[O]ur study is meaningful only when it treats the existing non-Western law as a whole which is 
pluralistically constructed of not only state law but other kinds of official law such as religious 
law or tribal law, and furthermore, unofficial law in various forms, whether supporting or 
conflicting with official law. 
Id. 
 74.  See, e.g., CHIBA, supra note 67, at 82 (providing an analysis of “Japanese work-oriented spirit 
of labor” as an “unofficial legal postulate”). 
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by the definiteness of particular social and institutional relationships.75 And yet, 
despite his insistence on the importance of custom, Chiba remained a sharp 
critic of some aspects of Japanese custom, including the treatment of women, 
laborers, and tenants.76 
I first met Professor Chiba at a coffee shop in Shinjuku, when he was 
already eighty years old. His hopefulness, energy, and sparkle was arresting. 
After that we met often, and when I returned to the United States, he made me 
a gift of a dousojin, a small clay spirit to be placed near the entry way of my 
house to guard against evil spirits. “You will need this in America,” he told me. 
Chiba’s own biography, as he told it to me, was something as follows. As a 
young man during World War II, he studied philosophy of law at Tohoku 
University. Upon graduation, he joined the research seminar of Professor 
Takeyoshi Kawashima, the father of Japanese sociology of law and importer of 
American legal realism to Japan.77 After the war, everyone was interested in all 
things Western—hence there was a need for comparative law as the society 
sought to modernize, westernize, and democratize under the watchful eye of 
American occupation forces. Yet Chiba was fascinated not with things foreign 
but with Japanese customary law. He insisted that one could not evaluate or 
support the new legal transplants without understanding “what was going on in 
the villages” as he put it, a forsaken place that elite Japanese intellectuals 
wanted nothing to do with. “I was ostracized, treated as crazy,” he told me. In 
1965, Chiba traveled to the University of Minnesota to work for an extended 
period of time with E. Adamson Hoebel, the anthropologist who collaborated 
with Karl Llewellyn on The Cheyenne Way.78 At that time, very few Japanese 
legal scholars had serious training in another discipline.79 
Late in his career, Chiba developed a strong interest in collaborative 
 
 75.  Id. at 81. Chiba writes: 
How can such an indefinite conception function to delineate an indisputable boundary 
between conflicting claims as definitely as expected of a legal standard? According to my 
preceding study, I have found a kind of conceptual scheme working interveningly as a 
functional complement to the indefinite conception of individual rights in order to have 
Japanese perceive on all occasions definite patterns of behavior to be legally approved. The 
functional complement of Japanese should be “the particular relationships between the 
parties concerned.” 
Id. 
 76.  See, e.g., id. at 115 (arguing that the legitimacy of formal law serves as a form of check on the 
regressive aspects of custom). 
 77.  See generally TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA: A THEORY OF THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (1949) 
(using sociological and philosophical concepts to theorize the similarities and differences between 
everyday law and state law in modernity). See also Eric A. Feldman, Law, Culture, and Conflict: 
Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, Public Law Research Paper 07-16 (2007) (elaborating on the 
significance of Kawashima’s work). 
 78.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE 
LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (2002). 
 79.  Chiba translated Hoebel’s The Law of Primitive Man. See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, 
HOJINRUIGAKU NO KISO RIRON [The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal 
Dynamics] (Masaji Chiba & Fumi Nakamura, trans., 1984) (1954). 
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scholarship involving scholars from throughout Asia. These cross-disciplinary 
teams conducted fieldwork together in Sri Lanka, Thailand, and elsewhere in 
Asia.80 A generation of Japanese legal anthropologists and comparative lawyers 
came to know each other and their Asian counterparts intimately through these 
projects and still talk about them with great fondness.  But most comparative 
lawyers, myself included, considered these projects as somehow less serious than 
his theoretical work on legal pluralism. These collaborations were perceived as 
the kind of stuff that would occupy the time of a scholar in semiretirement. 
Chiba’s work belongs to an era that is drawing to a close. His strong view of 
cultural difference and cultural authenticity is no longer viable in an era of 
cultural hybridity and interconnectedness and in the aftermath of 
anthropological critiques of the culture concept.81 His faith in science as a way of 
navigating between the twin pitfalls of self-deprecation and ethnocentricity no 
longer convinces us. 
Yet there is another dimension to the work that remains fresh to this day. In 
particular, I want to draw attention to one of Chiba’s most original comparative 
observations about what he called Western law—its ability to resist challenge 
from the outside. Chiba identified two key devices. One was challenge-
absorbing mechanisms, such as the way abstract principles are supplemented by 
legal ideas, like justice or equity, that can be adapted to absorb challenges.82 
Another was challenge-rejecting mechanisms, such as the distinction between 
facts and norms—whereby a challenge that the facts do not fit the law is met by 
an assertion that law is just a system of norms impervious to politics, economics, 
ethics, religion, and so on.83 Here, Chiba takes not simply law but legal theory 
and legal theorists as the object of comparison. And he does what the best of 
 
 80.  See, e.g., Masaji Chiba, Law and Culture in Sri Lanka: A Research Report on Asian Indigenous 
Law, RESEARCH GROUP ON ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW (1984); see also SURIRANKA NO TAGENTEKI 
HOTAISEi (LEGAL PLURALISM IN SRI LANKA: TRANSPLANTATION OF WESTERN LAW AND 
COUNTERACTION OF INDIGENOUS LAW) (Masaji Chiba ed. 1988). 
 81.  See GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL 
CRITIQUE: AN EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 3–4 (2d. ed. 1999). 
Experimental strategies to alter the standard forms of anthropological accounts are 
expressing, on one hand, a new sensitivity to the difficulty of representing cultural differences, 
given current, almost overriding, perceptions of the global homogenization of cultures, and on 
the other, a sophisticated recognition of the historical and political-economic realities which, 
while not denied, have been elided or finessed in much past writing. 
Id. 
 82.  See CHIBA, supra note 67, at 46 (“The more abstract and therefore the more apart from social 
realities is the concept, the more qualified the concept becomes for application to wider social 
realities.”). 
 83.  Id. at 46–47. 
The purpose of the [“separation of norm from fact”] principle is primarily understood as 
limiting law to a specifically authorized formal system of norms, banishing all the other phases 
and their outcomes of human social lives from the world of law with the label of fact. As an 
implication every connection of law with, or interference in, law by the world of fact, however 
substantially relevant to the law and its application it may be, is cut off, rejected and 
invalidated. 
Id. 
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comparative law can do—he gives us both a new vantage point on our own legal 
system and a new agenda for political critique. 
The enduring contribution of Chiba’s work, I want to suggest, was precisely 
the challenge—the way Chiba’s work challenged and continues to challenge 
both the Japanese and “Westerners” alike. There are two senses to the idea of 
the challenge. One is challenge as a confrontation or critique of others, and the 
other is challenge as a “test of one’s abilities or character”84 that transforms or 
extends one’s own potentialities and generates the responsiveness to curiosity 
that makes an eighty-year-old man’s eyes sparkle. The idea of the challenge 
gives us a different vision of comparative law’s disciplinary mission and energy. 
It demands that we ask what it means to be a challenge in our own time. My 
answer would include: to make scholarship that in its form and content is 
responsive to the current moment—its particular versions of challenge-
absorbing and challenge-rejecting mechanisms; to be intellectually adventurous 
and ambitious—to take intellectual and professional risks; and to be more 
intellectually and professionally generous—open to the interventions of 
younger scholars and of ideas not phrased in the language of power. 
Yet, before we become too nostalgic for comparison, it is necessary to ask 
why comparison was the master tool for so many decades. What was the social 
or political niche that it filled? 
Like collaboration, comparison was also a key template for thought far 
beyond the legal academy, and especially in the increasingly global economy. In 
brief, comparison played a special role in a market economy founded on 
coordination through the institution of price.85 During this period, the market 
was accepted as the ideal means of human, institutional, mechanical, scientific, 
national coordination. Yet it necessitated certain key building blocks or 
supports. One such building block was the legal architecture that provided the 
ground rules for market transactions, such as the institution of private 
property.86 Yet another key building block was the production, translation, and 
 
 84.  Challenge, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
30298?rskey=aYtFte&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid, (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
 85.  See generally Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 519, 527 (1945). Hayek writes: 
It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering 
change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch 
merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, 
in order to adjust their activities to changes o which they may never know more than is 
reflected in the price movement. 
Id. 
 86.  See FRIEDRICH HAYEK, VOLUME 3: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 43 (1979). 
The effectiveness of the market order and of the institution of several property rests on the 
fact that in most instances the producers of particular goods and services will be able to 
determine who will benefit from them and who [will] pay for their costs. The conditions that 
the benefits due to a person’s activities can be confined to those willing to pay for them, and 
withheld from those not willing (and, correspondingly, that all harm done has to be paid for), 
is largely satisfied so far as material commodities in private possessions are concerned: 
ownership of a particular movable subject generally confers on the owner control over most of 
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serving up of commensurable difference—the kind of difference that price could 
coordinate. 
This was the job of comparison: describing and organizing—objectifying87—
difference. Comparison played a very practical role in market transactions. How 
could arbitrageurs profit on the difference between the price of oil in one 
market or another without a comparative understanding of the legal, cultural, 
and economic institutions that determined price in each place to begin with?88 
Coordination through price demanded comparative thinking. Sometimes this 
actually required practical comparative legal work—an expert legal analysis of 
the similarities and differences between two jurisdictions’ approaches to a 
particular legal rule. But in a more general sense, the fact that the market 
functioned on comparison gave comparison legitimacy as an intellectual device.  
The very ubiquity of comparative thought in the world legitimated its scholarly 
applications as well. The postwar development of comparative techniques for 
legal scholarship reflected a broader template for postwar political and 
economic life. 
C. From Comparison to Collaboration 
Today, in contrast, there is an increasing loss of faith in the coordinative 
power of price, or the ability of liberal legal institutions (tended by professional 
lawyers) to produce a well-functioning market. It is the collaborative economy, 
not the neoliberal economy, that captures attention. Today, also, it is not 
comparison but collaboration that powerfully conjures this potent triad of 
science, policy, and pedagogy.89 Like comparison a generation ago, collaboration 
is now at once a scholarly method, a necessary professional skill, and a policy-
relevant practice. 
As we saw, academic comparative work reflected a wider social interest in 
comparison grounded in the role of comparative thought in the neoliberal 
economy of the time. But with the loss of faith in that neoliberal economic 
model and the rise of a collaborative economy, a different kind of epistemology 
 
the beneficial or harmful effects of its use. . . In some instances the conditions which the 
market requires in order to perform its ordering function will be satisfied only with respect of 
some of the results of activities of the individuals. These will on the whole still be effectively 
guided by the price mechanism, even though some of the effects of these activities will spill 
over on other who either do not pay for the benefits they receive or are not compensated for 
damage done to them. 
Id. See also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 48 (2000) (“just as a lake needs a hydroelectric plant to produce 
usable energy, assets need a formal property system to produce significant surplus value”). 
 87.  See WEBB KEANE, SIGNS OF RECOGNITION: POWERS AND HAZARDS OF REPRESENTATION 
IN AN INDONESIAN SOCIETY 14 (1997) (arguing that objectification requires comparison—an operation 
in which a “new event can be recognized as an instance of something that is already known”). 
 88.  See HIROKAZU MIYAZAKI, ARBITRAGING JAPAN: DREAMS OF CAPITALISM AT THE END OF 
FINANCE (2013) (describing how financial arbitrageurs produce difference in order to arbitrage it). 
 89.  I have written elsewhere about why collaboration now captures the imagination in this way.  
See Riles, supra note 45, at 555. 
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and a different scholarship ensues. There is less need for academics to compare 
in order to facilitate coordination since the starting point of collaboration is no 
longer commensurable difference. In fact, in an era in which truths from market 
wisdom to political wisdom emerge out of collaboration among ordinary people 
only loosely connected institutionally, whose sheer number and diversity 
substitutes for their lack of demonstrated expertise, there is less need for expert 
scholarly descriptions of social phenomena altogether. 
IV 
RESPONDING TO COLLABORATION: LESSONS FROM THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
EXPERIENCE 
The last two parts described how the terms of academic conversation have 
shifted as a result of changes in how people think about and act within markets. 
The key point was a grim one for comparative lawyers: the world has changed in 
a way that has made comparative scholarly moves seem somehow beside the 
point, irrelevant, uninteresting. We will return to the implications of this lack of 
interest in comparative law in the conclusion. 
And yet even if comparative law is no longer able to conjure up interest, the 
misunderstanding of foreignness, the global potential for violence, and even the 
desire for adventure that first motivated an earlier generation’s passion for 
comparison as an intellectual and ethical project certainly have not abated. In 
many countries around the world, citizens are increasingly turning inward, 
drawn more towards nationalism than the promise of cosmopolitanism. Despite 
the demonstrable globalization of law, there is still a remarkable lack of 
teaching about things foreign, or about how to encounter or deal with 
foreignness in legal practice, in mainstream law school classes. In other words, 
although collaboration pushes the fundamental problem comparative law 
sought to address to one side, it does not resolve it. Indeed, even the most flat-
footed management consultant will aver that collaboration does not in fact 
obviate foreignness or eliminate the need for the kind of reflexive 
understanding of one’s own condition that enables empathy for the situation of 
others. 
And yet before we launch an attack on the parochialism of the legal 
academy or turn our energies to a critique of collaboration, we might pause to 
take stock of how deeply the collaborative impulse has already defined our own 
lives as scholars and as economic and political actors. Each one of us is already 
engaged in myriad collaborative ventures, personal and professional, technical 
and institutional, scholarly and activist. When we do this, we are likely to come 
to appreciate that the very ubiquity and mundanity of collaboration discourse 
and practice in law, markets and policy means that we are all already 
collaborators in all the possible senses of the term.90 Hence a response to 
 
 90.  Nicholas Atkin, The Home Fronts: Europe at War, 1939–1945, in A COMPANION TO EUROPE 
1900–1945 456, 463–64 (Gordon Martel, ed., 2011). Atkin writes: 
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collaboration cannot simply be critique from outside—it must entail doing 
something with and within this template. If there is no “outside” to 
collaboration, we must abandon the pretense of being outside or above the 
current cultural moment and find some move within the form, so to speak—
some way to turn collaboration “inside out.”91 
It is here that the recent anthropological experience with collaboration may 
provide a useful guide. In anthropology, the movement from comparison to 
collaboration has a somewhat different genealogy. It emerges out of the 
changed conditions and purposes of ethnographic research in the context of 
decolonization and the critiques anthropologists leveled at their own traditional 
disciplinary practices in the 1980s and early 1990s. In response to this crisis of 
ethnographic authority, anthropologists began to explore new methodologies. 
They began to produce more self-reflexive accounts of how ethnographic texts 
were written that challenged the notion of the singular ethnographic author and 
acknowledged the role of anthropologists’ subjects in constructing the 
ethnographic narrative.92 These developments grew into an appreciation that the 
“others” anthropologists once studied were in fact cotheorists and even “para-
ethnographers”,93 not simply subjects of research. Anthropologists began to 
jettison the heroic image of the data-gathering fieldworker. As Paul Rabinow 
put it, “in anthropology, it ought to be time . . . to sacrifice the individualism as 
the subject position that has been at the core of anthropology’s approach to 
research, publication, pedagogy, and above all, thinking.”94 It followed also that 
anthropologists were not simply objective observers but participants, implicated 
in the governance structures they described. 
In response, a new activist anthropology95 explicitly aimed to include 
anthropologists’ subjects in both the research design and research collection 
process, and to make anthropological tools available to disempowered social 
groups who might use this research in social struggles. Anthropologists also 
 
It was not necessary to be ideologically committed to the New Order in order to engage in 
collaboration broadly defined . . . . It was the Germans, too, who encouraged “cultural” 
collaborators—artists, writers, and musicians—who had to balance their commitment to 
writing and performance with the circumstances of occupation . . . . As David Littlejohn 
suggests, “collaboration” ranged from volunteering for the SS to buying a postcard of Pétain. 
Id. 
 91.  ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT 18 (2001) (“The necessity of the exercise stems 
from the way in which it is already known from the start. The achievement, then, lies not in the 
discovery of new knowledge but in the effort to make what we already know analytically accessible.”). 
 92.  WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (George E. Marcus & 
James Clifford eds., 1986) (problematizing the way anthropologists have traditionally described other 
cultures). 
 93.  Douglas Holmes & George E. Marcus, Cultures of Expertise and the Management of 
Globalization: Toward the Re-functioning of Ethnography. in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, 
POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 235 (Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 
2005) (coining the term “paraethnography” to signify modes of knowledge production that resemble 
ethnography practiced by other kinds of social actors such as central bankers). 
 94.  PAUL RABINOW, THE ACCOMPANIMENT: ASSEMBLING THE CONTEMPORARY 202 (2011). 
 95.  See, e.g., Stuart Kirsch, Sustainable Mining, 34 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 87 (2010). 
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began to “study up”96 —to consider how ethnography of elites and powerful 
actors in their own societies could contribute to progressive social change. 
At the same time, when anthropologists turned to studying elites such as 
scientists, lawyers, or financiers, they encountered busy, educated people who 
would not tolerate “being studied” but might be interested in working 
collaboratively with a visiting researcher on an account of their world.97 Hence 
collaboration of one kind or another became a necessary aspect of fieldwork 
among elites. Yet what was born out of necessity soon was discovered to be a 
source of innovation and insight. As Douglas Holmes and George Marcus write, 
“Working amid and on collaborations significantly shifts the purposes of 
ethnography from description and analysis, inevitably distanced practices for 
which it has settled, to a deferral to subjects’ modes of knowing, a function to 
which ethnography has long aspired.” 98 
This experience is particularly relevant for the turn to collaboration as a way 
of managing foreignness in which, as explained above, representations have 
collapsed into the social and economic worlds they once described, leaving 
comparative lawyers, as the producers of expert descriptions of social and legal 
differences, with little to do.99 From the point of view of the anthropological 
experience with collaboration, comparative lawyers might ask whether the 
separation of the world of things foreign from the scientific description of that 
world embodied in the old modality of comparison is really something worth 
being nostalgic about. Perhaps there are other templates for intellectual 
adventure, vocation, and political action altogether. 
In recent years, anthropologists of science have taken these purposeful 
conflations of the subject of study and the authorial voice a step further by 
collaborating institutionally with scientists, or by attempting to emulate the way 
scientists collaborate. For example Chris Kelty has experimented with 
organizing a collaborative team of anthropologists of science on the model of 
how the Linux open software project is produced.100 These projects have not 
always been successful. Paul Rabinow’s account of what, by his own terms, was a 
failed collaboration with scientists is refreshingly honest in its description of his 
own slippage from ethnographer of the collaboration into angered participant 
 
 96.  Laura Nader, Up the Anthropologist—Perspectives Gained from Studying Up, in 
REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 284 (Dell H. Hymes ed. 1972) (coining the phrase “studying up” for 
the ethnography of elites whose economic or social status is greater than that of the ethnographer). 
 97.  As George Marcus writes, “Many fieldworkers today are simply not free in a practical sense to 
impose the classic conditions of fieldwork, or the difficulties of so doing are quite different from those 
related in classic accounts.” George E. Marcus, Introduction, in FIELDWORK IS NOT WHAT IT USED TO 
BE: LEARNING ANTHROPOLOGY’S METHOD IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 1, 11 (James D Faubion & 
George E Marcus eds., 2009). 
 98.  Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, Collaboration Today and the Re-Imagination of the 
Classic Scene of Fieldwork Encounter, 1 COLLABORATIVE ANTHROPOLOGIES 81, 81–82 (2008) 
(citations omitted). 
 99.  See supra notes 41–43 and text accompanying notes. 
 100.  See,  e.g., Christopher Kelty, Collaboration, Coordination and Composition: Fieldwork after the 
Internet, in FIELDWORK ISN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE (James Faubion & George Marcus ed., 2008). 
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who viewed the scientists as political enemies rather than coconstructors.101 The 
ethnographic art lies in the ability to notice and pursue the remarkable 
opportunities for provoking a certain kind of intersubjective experiment—and 
then reflecting on them creatively after the fact in the service of cultural insight. 
Yet when anthropologists dive into collaboration, and the subject of study 
becomes such mundane and even infuriating decisions such as how to run a 
meeting, what to say in an email, or how to design a web page, they often seem 
to lose their ethnographic instincts. 
Yet these projects hold out one simple parallel lesson for comparative 
lawyers: the divide between the foreign and the familiar, between the objects of 
study and the expert who describes them, between T-1 and T-2, is no longer 
plausible. The parallel suggests an alternative explanation of the collapse of 
comparative law into collaboration rooted more in an epistemological shift 
away from positivist social science than in the academic implications of 
changing market forms.102 Just as anthropologists, forced to confront a changed 
world, found that their new collaborative methods ultimately produced more 
interesting insights, it may be that collaboration will be good for comparative 
law after all. 
Yet how can comparative lawyers turn collaboration into something of 
scholarly and ethical value? Here, the collaborations of the anthropology of 
science do not provide a highly successful role model. As mentioned above, 
these have not in fact been wildly successful. Feminist anthropologists however 
may serve as a better role model for they have long gone beyond simply 
recognizing that collaboration is a crucial aspect of their own expertise by 
experimenting with how conversation and political action is possible across 
political and cultural differences. 
Motivated initially by political solidarity with the women they encountered 
in the field,103 feminists engaged in ethnographic collaborations not simply to 
 
 101.  See RABINOW, supra note 94, at 164. 
At SynBERC there was an inner circle, an old boys club . . . . Many of the decisions made 
were relatively petty, and if one insisted, one could usually find out what happened. In a word, 
the situation was more banal than evil . . . . I understood that this lack of transparency was not 
simply a calculated strategy directed at excluding those of us not in the biosciences but rather 
a habitual way of dealing with subordinates, information, and potential competitors. That 
begin said, analytic clarity goes only so far, and this exclusion was irksome, given that I was a 
principal investigator in the project. 
Id. 
 102.  Although numerous traditions of scholarship would understand epistemological and material 
conditions as linked.  See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES 
IN GOVERNMENTALITY: WITH TWO LECTURES BY AND AN INTERVIEW WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT 87 
(Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds., 1991). 
 
 103.  See STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS, supra note 49, at 23. 
At stake for feminist as opposed to other scholars is the promotion of women’s interests, that 
is, the promotion of a single perspective. In the end, the “interests” are not so much those 
internal to the construction of knowledge—the canons of an adequate description—as ones 
external to it. They come from the social world of which we are also part. 
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produce descriptions but also to build a set of relationships between women, 
both in the field and in the academy. Feminists paid attention to the ethical, 
political, and intellectual opportunities that inhered in these relations as such, 
not simply as a means to the end of description or expert representations.104 For 
feminist anthropologists, creativity and scholarly ethics never inhered solely in 
description. Indeed, this was why the wider discipline of anthropology was slow 
to accept feminist anthropology as legitimate—to some, it seemed more 
“activist” than “scientific.” The feminist model for comparative law at this 
moment, then, might be the following: scholarly work need not take the form of 
a description at all. It might take the form of a relation. What if, in an era in 
which descriptions have collapsed into institutions,105 scholarship took the form 
of an institution rather than a text, for example? 
There is a second and more important lesson for comparative law in feminist 
anthropology, concerning what to do when one is already “inside” the forms one 
finds problematic, such as collaboration. In order to grasp this point, recall that 
midcentury functionalist anthropology, unlike midcentury functionalist 
comparative law, eschewed broad-brush cross-cultural comparisons in favor of 
deep contextual analyses.106 As Marilyn Strathern has written, this created a 
challenge for feminist anthropology.107 Specifically, anthropologists were 
committed to a holistic and deeply contextual approach to description (in 
contrast to an older brand of “classical” anthropology that organized societies 
according to typologies).108 Yet feminists took a far more muscular comparative 
approach that treated “the problem of women” everywhere as comparable. 
Feminists even classified entire societies based on “the status of women.”109 The 
feminist brand of comparison was actually quite similar in this respect to 
 
Id. 
 104.  See, e.g., FAYE GINSBURG, EPILOGUE: PRO-DIALOGUE, in CONTESTED LIVES: THE 
ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1998). See also Micaela di Leonardo, 
Introduction Gender, Culture and Political Economy: Feminist Anthropology in Historical Perspective, 
in GENDER AT THE CROSSROADS OF KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE 
POSTMODERN ERA 1 (Micaela di Leonardo ed., 1991). 
 105.  See supra notes 29–31 and text accompanying notes. 
 106.  MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFT, supra note 49, at 8. 
 107.  See id. at 22. 
 108.  See id. at 5–6. Strathern writes: 
We have considerable information about the distinctiveness of these particular cultures and 
societies but much less idea why we acquired it. For the holism of the monograph rests on its 
internal coherence, which creates a sense of autonomous knowledge and of its own 
justification. Consequently, the terms within which individual monographs are written will not 
necessarily provide the terms for a comparative exercise. 
Id. 
 109.  Strathern notes: 
A presumption of natural similarity between all the members of one sex comes to justify the 
ethical stance that the same questions must be asked of their conditions everywhere: to do less 
would be to treat some as less. In universalizing questions about women’s subordination, then, 
feminist scholarship shares with classical anthropology the idea that myriad forms of social 
organization to be found across the world are comparable to one another. 
Id. at 31. 
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midcentury comparative law, which also organized and ranked societies 
according to whether they “did” or “did not” have certain modern legal 
institutions. As both a feminist and anthropologist, Strathern sought to come to 
terms with the contradiction between these two views of comparison. As an 
anthropologist, she recognized the limitations of broad-brush comparisons. As a 
feminist, she recognized their political utility. More than this, to be a feminist 
entailed thinking in this broad way about gender. She could not disavow this 
kind of comparison. This is what she meant when she labeled comparison a 
“problematic term.”  
I raise this example because comparative lawyers now face an analogous 
dilemma with respect to collaboration: whatever critical concerns we might have 
about collaboration as a template for scholarly or political life, it is already too 
much a part of our practice. To be a scholar, or indeed a social actor today, is to 
engage in collaboration. It is our problematic term. 
Strathern responded to this dilemma by noticing what work these 
comparisons actually did for feminists. Specifically, these comparisons enabled 
relationships among feminists themselves: “One position evokes others,” and 
hence, “[t]he positions are created as dependent upon one another . . . . 
Feminism lies in the debate itself.”110 That is, comparison was valuable to her, as 
a feminist, not because it was “true” but because of the relations among 
feminists it made possible. This led her to think of the problem in a surprising 
way: rather than rejecting comparison or replacing it with some other term, 
Strathern staged an experiment in “the way one might hold analysis as a kind of 
convenient or controlled fiction.”111 Her innovative book The Gender of the Gift 
experiments with broad-brush comparison as a form of working fiction—
acknowledged repeatedly as such, while still untenable at many levels, but to 
which she would submit her inquiry, in order that something surprising might 
turn up in her encounter with others. In a sense, this is all she could do, since as 
a committed feminist she too inhabited the form of comparison that was so 
problematic to the late-modernist anthropologist. 
Fiction is actually a familiar and highly effectual legal technique. As I have 
discussed elsewhere, the law is supremely skilled at treating one thing “as if” it 
were another, all the while understanding very well that it is not.112 When we 
 
 110.  Id. at 24. 
 111.  Id. at 6. 
 112.  See Annelise Riles, Is the Law Hopeful, in HOPE IN THE ECONOMY (Hirokazu Miyazaki & 
Richard Swedberg eds., forthcoming). 
A legal fiction is a legal conclusion—an act of judgment—that takes the form of a factual 
statement: It is a theory presented as if it were a fact. What we have then is a double “As if”: 
the As if of fact (the subjunctive assertion of a factual claim that is known to be false—the 
woman merges into her husband) turns on the As if relationship of judgment to fact itself—
the legal conclusion that takes the form of a fact. And here we have the trick of the device: for 
if the legal conclusion takes the form of a fact, the fact that is known by all to be false, also 
becomes, in a sense, by operation of law, true. 
Id. See also Annelise Riles, Karen Knop & Ralf Michaels, From Multiculturalism to Technique: 
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (2012). 
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assert that a corporation is a person, for example, we are acting as if it is a 
person for specific and limited legal purposes, and to great social and economic 
effects. The implication of all this for comparative law is the following: 
recognizing that collaboration is our “problematic term”—that we are already 
inside collaboration—what if we responded by playing with collaboration as a 
kind of legal “fiction”? 
This is the set of intuitions behind the project I now will describe: Meridian 
180. First is the feminist notion that scholarly work need not take the form of a 
description but might take the form of a set of relationships. For example, what 
if, in an era in which textual descriptions of foreign laws have collapsed into new 
collaborative arrangements in the world that obviate the need for description , 
scholarly description also took the form of a new institutional arrangement? 
Second, what if, rather than critiquing collaboration from the outside, we treated 
it as a “convenient or controlled fiction”113 for action, one that proceeds from a 
recognition of its deeply problematic nature? Such an experiment might have 
difficulty being recognized as serious comparative law scholarship, just as 
feminist anthropology was at first denounced as unscholarly and 
incomprehensible. But it might also contribute something of value to the 
current moment just as comparative law contributed to a critical cosmopolitan 
perspective for postwar legal studies. 
V 
MERIDIAN 180 
In March of 2011, in the immediate aftermath of the Great Tohoku 
Earthquake and nuclear accident at Fukushima, Japan, a transnational group of 
legal scholars, anthropologists, economists, practicing lawyers, government 
officials, securities firm employees, a postmodern theologian, a few artists, and a 
smattering of others, began to talk about one surreal aspect of the crisis: the 
constant misreadings across linguistic groups and different forms of expertise 
with a stake in the crisis, the points of disconnect within national discourses 
about the crisis, and the thinness of the transnational understanding of what was 
going on.114 The crisis at Fukushima and its unfolding regional and international 
 
 113.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 114.  To quote the mission statement of Meridian 180: 
Why Meridian 180? 
The current state of the Asia-Pacific dialogue, especially among leaders at the international 
level but also among experts and professionals, is impoverished compared to the magnitude of 
the challenges that those in the region confront. Almost daily, we observe situations arising in 
which experts in different fields, or representatives of different linguistic, cultural or national 
groups, misunderstand one another because they operate on the basis of unrecognized biases 
and blind spots—and thus, miss opportunities for creative alternatives to given political 
stalemates. Misunderstanding and miscommunication escalate potential for discord and 
conflict, and for serious errors in policy-making. 
We recognize that the world is on the verge of a “global reset” in politics, economic and 
financial relations, social justice, and environmental conditions, in which given paradigms, 
political alliances, and modes of expert discourse no longer hold. Accordingly, our mission is 
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consequences seemed to crystallize and confirm an inchoate sense many of us 
had that our own conversations—among intellectual elites in different countries, 
and also across disciplinary boundaries—were simply far too thin to address the 
needs of the political moment.115 
In thinking about the causes of this disconnect, it seemed that many of these 
could not be adequately addressed by traditional scholarly methods.116 Some 
obvious causes were persisting language difficulties, or the logistical problems 
and costs associated with getting busy people to spend substantial amounts of 
time together so that they could reach a deeper understanding of one another’s 
positions.117 But there were others too. First was a degree of lack of comfort or 
trust.118 Second was a lack of interest in investing time in such a conversation. 
On both sides of the Pacific and beyond, certain stereotyped assumptions about 
how others think led many of us to dismiss misunderstandings as the product of 
a lack of scholarly sophistication, or a certain political or cultural narrowness 
elsewhere.119 
We organized ourselves as Meridian 180, named after the 180th meridian, 
the international date line that separates East from West and that is also the 
antimeridian, the paradigmatic point of inversion of the Prime Meridian, the 
paradigmatic orientation. Three years on, this collaboration of scholars, 
policymakers, and professionals in Asia-Pacific, the United States, and 
throughout the rest of the world interested in new ways of thinking about law 
and markets now includes over 650 invited members.120 We meet in person once 
or twice a year as funding allows, and, in the interim, online. 
Unlike most of what is on the Internet, our conversations are private among 
 
one of preparedness. Rather than take a retrospective view, we seek to anticipate and prepare 
intellectually and politically for future environmental disasters, political/military conflicts, and 
serious problems of social justice in the region by assembling a unique group of creative 
thinkers and building relationships among them that can be mobilized at times of need. 
Why Meridian 180?, MERIDIAN 180: TRANSFORMING THE TRANSPACIFIC DIALOGUE, http://meridian-
180.org/en/why-meridian-180 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 115.  See generally Eudes Lopes, Forum Summary: What Role Can Intellectuals and Professionals 
Play in Crises like Japan’s Natural and Nuclear Disasters? (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.meridian-
180.org/node/731. 
 116.  See generally About Meridian 180, MERIDIAN 180: TRANSFORMING THE TRANSPACIFIC 
DIALOGUE, http://meridian-180.org/en/about (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 117.  See generally What Makes Us Different, MERIDIAN 180: TRANSFORMING THE TRANSPACIFIC 
DIALOGUE, http://meridian-180.org/en/what-makes-us-different (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 118.  See generally Why Meridian 180?, MERIDIAN 180: TRANSFORMING THE TRANSPACIFIC 
DIALOGUE, http://meridian-180.org/en/why-meridian-180 (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 119.  See generally Our Members, MERIDIAN 180: TRANSFORMING THE TRANSPACIFIC DIALOGUE, 
http://meridian-180.org/en/participants (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 120.  Meridian 180 is governed by a “Core Idea Group” (CIG) comprised of three anthropologists 
working in the anthropology of the contemporary, a senior U.S. government lawyer and policymaker 
who has completed all the requirements for a Ph.D. but the doctoral dissertation in anthropology, an 
Australian international lawyer working on globalization and data politics in the critical legal studies 
tradition, a Chinese constitutional theorist, a Japanese labor economist, and a Korean financial lawyer 
turned university executive. See generally Core Idea Group, MERIDIAN 180: TRANSFORMING THE 
TRANSPACIFIC DIALOGUE, http://meridian-180.org/en/core-idea-group (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
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the participants. The conversations are serious, detailed, substantive, and focus 
on the unknowns, the contradictions, the points at which members are not sure 
what to think.121 Members participate in whichever of four core languages they 
are most comfortable with, and comments are translated quickly by young legal 
scholars educated in two or more legal cultures. Our mode of operation is under 
the radar rather than headline-grabbing. Although we post summaries of our 
discussions on our website and produce quasischolarly publications based on 
our discussions, we have no Twitter account and have so far rebuffed the 
journalists who have expressed an interest in following the project. 
And I want to add one further point, because of the pervasiveness of the 
ideology that collaborative dialogue somehow produces itself122: this field site, 
like all others, is hard work. The conversations are sustained through elaborate, 
if rickety, social and institutional scaffolding constantly in need of replacement 
and repair. There are people to hire and to fire, students to recruit, and members 
and potential members who need to be inspired and motivated. It is a field full 
of “glitches” in the science and technology studies sense of the term123—
mistranslated documents, miscommunicated messages, institutional turf battles, 
people who misread one another’s intentions, and technologies that mislead, fail 
to inspire, or break down altogether. For me, the ethnographic experience of 
Meridian 180 most often presents itself as a long list of problems and to-dos. 
A. From Texts to Relations 
Certainly, at first glance, this project does not resemble anything one would 
conventionally label comparative law. In the traditional genre, comparative law 
takes law or lawyers as its subject (comparative law).124 Here, rather than 
comparing sites of law—legal norms, doctrines, or institutions—Meridian 180 
engages those who would traditionally be the objects of those sites (lawyers, 
regulators, and legal scholars) as thinking cosubjects.125 In this respect, the 
project responds directly to the social and epistemological conditions described 
in the previous parts. It exploits the recognition that we are all on the “inside” of 
 
 121.  Our online conversations take the form of “forums” launched by a member with a short essay 
laying out a particular intellectual or political quandary. 
 122.  See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2001) (providing a critique of this 
ideology). 
 123.  See BRUNO LATOUR & STEVEN WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1986) (on network stability as an achievement, not something that can be 
assumed). See also, Casper Bruun Jensen, Review, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the 
Global Financial Markets, 7 EAST ASIAN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL 517, 522 (2013) (on glitches as points in which sociotechnical networks begin to crumble and 
dissipate); Sergio Latorre, Legal Technicalities in Conditions Of Political Conflict: The Case Of Land 
Tenure Disputes In Colombia (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Cornell Law School) (on file with 
author). 
 124.  See, e.g., Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Knowledge, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 305, 306 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhardt Zimmerman eds., 2006) 
(arguing that comparative law is a special branch of comparative studies focusing on law). 
 125.  See generally Miyazaki, supra note 83 (discussing informants as thinking subjects), 
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collaboration and that the distinction between the experts and the rest has 
collapsed. It pushes that recognition to its next logical step: a conversation in 
which various forms of experts and nonexperts, foreigners to one another in 
many ways, are literally on the inside of the project together. 
Moreover, law is not always the explicit subject of the conversation. Forum 
topics include some standard comparative law topics such as the meaning of the 
rule of law,126 or the relationship between law and culture,127 but also topics such 
as “democracy in an age of shifting demographics,”128 and even “the meaning of 
happiness.”129 Some of our discussions stretch the sociolegal impulse to focus on 
law in action130 to the point to which some may ask, where is the law? Perhaps 
some readers may read it as more of an institutional or activist project than a 
serious scholarly project. Although Meridian 180 has some of the indicia of 
scholarship (we produce edited books based on conference proceedings, for 
example) it also has many of the indicia of the problematic collaborations 
analyzed in part III. And yet, ironically, because of its collaborative nature, the 
project is quite literally at law’s institutional center: Meridian 180’s institutional 
home is a law school with a long tradition of comparative law,131 where it is 
embraced as both expanding and enriching the academic vision—giving the 
legal academy a new kind of scholarly reach—while also providing professional 
training in cross-cultural collaboration to emerging lawyers entering into a 
highly globalized world of practice. 
Yet, inspired by the feminist anthropological insight that scholarship might 
be as much about the relations it sets into motion as it is about the descriptive 
outputs, I do want to claim this experiment in collaborative legal theory-making 
in four languages as a postreflexive form of comparative law. Meridian 180 
departs from traditional comparative law and meets feminist anthropology 
where it becomes a modality of relating to the Other, not of describing or 
translating the Other (although the latter must happen along the way, or after 
the fact, just as the old comparative descriptions and translations depended 
 
 126.  See Tomohiro Saito, Michelle Min & Hanna Ko, Forum Summary: Rule of Law Anew—
Comparison Across Countries, available at http://meridian-180.org/en/forums/forum-summary-rule-law-
anew-comparison-across-countries (This discussion attempted to break down the concept of the rule of 
law into its essential components in order to clarify its ongoing relevance across jurisdictions.). 
 127.  See Toru Yamada, Forum Summary: Law and Cultural Complexity, available at 
http://meridian-180.org/en/forums/forum-summary-law-and-cultural-complexity (This discussion 
unpacked the different taken-for-granted starting points for jurisprudential debates across the Pacific 
rim.). 
 128.  See Michael Lee, Forum Summary: Is Democracy Sustainable in an Aging Nation?, available at 
http://meridian-180.org/en/forums/forum-summary-democracy-sustainable-aging-nation. 
 129.  See Elise de Vido, Forum Summary: What is Happiness?, available at http://meridian-
180.org/en/forums/forum-summary-what-happiness. 
 130.  See generally STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE M FRIEDMAN, & ELIZABETH MERTZ, LAW 
IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER. LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER (2007). 
 131.  Meridian 180 is a project of the Clarke Program in East Asian Law and Culture at Cornell 
University Law School, in partnership with the Ewha Women’s University School of Law in Seoul, 
Korea. 
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upon personal and professional relations along the way and after the fact). It 
responds to the dominant form of the moment—collaboration—by recasting 
that form in terms of the feminist commitment to relations rather than textual 
outputs per se.132 
B. From Expert Purposes to Amateurism as a Controlled Fiction 
If, as suggested above, Meridian 180 has many indicia of the kinds of 
collaborations celebrated today, there is also something askew about this 
particular collaboration: from its inception, we have had no common purpose to 
which each could contribute her respective expertise. Although we have a range 
of “projects,” from addressing the consequences of war memory in the Asia-
Pacific region to rethinking the intellectual architecture of global finance, our 
overall goals remain oddly unarticulated. Our collaboration requires our 
members to take the risk of acting the absurd in the terms of management 
theories of collaboration described in part II: doing without clear purpose, 
together. Rather, from the moment of the project’s inception in the shadow of 
the awareness of the many failures that had led to the crisis at Fukushima, we 
have been living, side by side, a moment of encounter with the limits of each of 
our own cultures and forms of expertise.133 
One term for this might be amateurism—the act and subject position of 
doing something without any actual economic or political purpose. In fact, 
amateurism is another buzzword of the new collaborative economy. Consider 
the musings of journalist, author, and Tony Blair advisor Charles Leadbeater: 
The 20th century witnessed the rise of professionals in medicine, science, education, 
and politics. In one field after another, amateurs and their ramshackle organisations 
were driven out by people who knew what they were doing and had certificates to 
prove it. The Pro-Am Revolution argues this historic shift is reversing. We’re 
witnessing the flowering of Pro-Am, bottom-up self-organisation and the crude, all or 
nothing, categories of professional or amateur will need to be rethought.
134
 
The model here is again crowdsourcing: nonexperts can be mobilized toward 
some shared economic or political purpose. Yet Meridian 180 works in precisely 
 
 132.  Cf. Julia Elyachar, Phatic Labor, Infrastructure, and the Question of Empowerment in Cairo, 37 
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST 452, 453 (2010) (using Bronislaw Malinowski’s terminology of “phatic 
communion”—activities that create ties “for their own sake, rather than for the purpose of conveying 
information”). 
 133.  See Annelise Riles, Market Collaboration: Finance, Culture, and Ethnography after 
Neoliberalism, 115 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 564 (2013). 
What distinguished the collaboration from most networks, virtual communities, deliberative 
experiments, or political pressure groups, many of which are also cross-disciplinary or 
transnational, is that we began from the standpoint of our sense of loss of any sense of the 
proper questions to be deliberated: we were not collaborating toward some common goal, to 
which each could contribute their respective expertise. We were simply living, side by side, 
this moment of our loss of expertise and, with it, our perspective on where we might be going. 
Id. 
 134.  Charles Leadbeater, quoted in Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative Economy, P2P 
FOUNDATION at 56 (April 2012), available at http://p2p.coop/files/reports/collaborative-economy-
2012.pdf. 
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the opposite way. It does not organize a crowd of nonprofessionals to contribute 
something useful or economically valuable toward some professional purpose. 
Indeed, our very professional and expert members, people whose professional 
lives are defined by purpose and by the added value they create everywhere in 
the economy, are self-consciously acting—as professional thinkers, lawyers, or 
financiers—without a clearly defined economic or political purpose.135 
My own fieldwork among lawyers shows that nonpurposeful play is a critical 
tool of innovation among sophisticated legal professionals.136 But I first learned 
of the importance of amateurism as a modality of cosmopolitanism from 
reading an earlier generation of comparative lawyers who cheerfully embraced 
the identity of the amateur cosmopolite (one replaced in the postwar era by the 
identity of the sober and professionalized social scientist).137 What was missed in 
this later critique of the earlier amateur comparativism was the sense of 
pleasure, adventure, and comparison for its own sake, rather than in the service 
of some professional purpose.138 
Yet there is also something different about the amateurism of Meridian 180 
from the festive romps through exotic societies of those grandfather figures of 
comparative law. What is different is that on the surface it looks like purposeful 
collaboration. It is here that we deploy the second insight of feminist 
anthropology described in the previous part, the notion that one might take a 
“problematic term” as a “convenient or controlled fiction.” In Meridian 180, we 
act “as if”139 we are seriously collaborating toward some other end—some 
 
 135.  See, e.g., Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter, Amateur-to-Amateur: The Rise of a New Creative 
Culture, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 567 3 (2006) (“The amateur-to-amateur trend in information practices 
calls into question the notion that the commercial incentive provided by copyright is the exclusive or 
preeminent way in which we encourage individuals to create useful content.”). 
 136.  Professional lawyers in the financial markets engage in a great deal of work that has no clear 
instrumental or pecuniary purpose (drafting documents that most likely will never be used, organizing 
study groups that most likely will never result in publications, etc). See ANNELISE RILES, supra note 35 
(2011). 
 137.  See Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L L J 221 (1999); Riles, supra note 65. 
 138.  See id. at 229. 
What comparativists share, as much as a body of knowledge, a set of methods or techniques, 
or even common research questions, is a passion for looking beyond, an empathy for 
differences but also for similarities, a faith in the self-transformative task of learning, and an 
interest in the form of knowledge itself. 
Id. 
 139.  The epistemology of “as if” builds on nested analogies in an effort to reason through a 
particular genre of knowledge. In this mode, the legitimacy of an argument is not validated by its 
objective truth per se, but by the power of the interpretive context that the analogical form illuminates. 
Thus, the “as if” epistemology is constantly erasing its own specificity and foregrounding the relevance 
of a broader template of knowledge. See HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF AS IF: A SYSTEM OF 
THE THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (1911). 
The basis for this method is as follows: since laws cannot include within their formulae all 
particular instances, certain special examples of an unusual nature are treated as if they 
belonged to them . . . . The a priori method of establishing laws must necessarily be 
supplemented by purely inductive observations of the logical procedure within the sciences 
themselves. 
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output, such as a better description of legal differences, legal reform proposals, 
consultation among policymakers, or book publications. Just as Marilyn 
Strathern could not disavow broad-brush comparisons of the condition of 
women in different locales because of her commitments to feminist politics in 
which such comparison had played a crucial role, the project does not explicitly 
disavow the reading of it as simple, mundane, instrumental cross-disciplinary 
and cross-national collaboration because such a reading is ethnographically 
significant—it is in tune with the moment we seek to understand and 
experiment with. And yet the ultimate purpose remains undefined. 
I personally feel the anxiety and discomfort of maintaining this absurd pose 
whenever I must explain the project to outside constituencies such as university 
administrators or potential donors. From this point of view, the project may 
appear as disorganized, self-contradictory, and even unserious. A collaboration 
without a well-defined purpose is an impossibility, a contradiction, and a mess. 
Yet there is a feminist point to the madness. The feminist ethnographic method, 




The context for this argument is a moment after the demise of area studies, 
after the loss of faith in neoliberalism, after the end of culture and price alike as 
explanatory devices, in which comparison and critique as modalities of 
intellectual work have been superseded by something darker—collaboration. 
The premise is that as economic forms shift, so does the nature of legal theory. 
As the nature of economic value is transforming, so is the value of scholarly 
work. The premise of Meridian 180 is that this condition also presents a unique 
methodological and ethical opportunity and challenge. Meridian 180 steps in to 
reclaim what is lost in the move from comparison to collaboration in 
comparative legal studies by engaging with what collaboration comes to mean 
in feminist anthropology in particular. Following the comparatist Masaji Chiba, 
I want to suggest that the project is an heir to comparative law in the way that it 
clarifies, and produces, challenges.141 What we are discovering through this 
postcomparative legal experiment, in other words, is what the challenges in and 
to the collaborative form might be—we are discovering new problems for 
theorization and action. 
A. Becoming Interested 
So what are the findings of this experiment with the collaborative form? 
Although the project is still ongoing, one key insight brings us back to Chiba’s 
 
Id. 
 140.  See STRATHERN, supra notes 49 & 111. 
 141.  See supra Part III.B. 
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emphasis on comparative law as challenge, and to the way comparative law 
itself no longer generates interest as it once did. 
The Meridian 180 project has faced many challenges. But one of the greatest 
of these is simply the challenge of generating and sustaining interest in the 
project among ourselves—as overcommitted and exhausted professionals and 
intellectuals. Amateurism is by definition a commitment based on interest 
alone.142 How do we generate commitment to something in which the purpose 
remains undefined? How else is interest generated than through purpose—how 
does one member’s provocation manage to elucidate a response on behalf of 
others, for example? 
On the face of it, this finding seems absurd. As we saw, a legitimate 
collaboration in the common understanding should be about producing value—
adding value somewhere, somehow. It should not be about generating interest in 
the collaboration itself. Yet, in fact, interest is a largely unstated but ubiquitous 
challenge in the collaborative economy. If one thinks for a moment about 
collaborations one is involved in, many of these ultimately collapse, or just 
peeter out, not for lack of technology or resources, but for simply a lack of 
sustained collective interest. 
The depth and complexity of the challenge of generating and sustaining 
interest would not have surprised Professor Chiba, who long ago suggested that 
Western legal scholars’ lack of interest in things that do not fit within existing 
paradigms is one of Western law’s crucial “challenge rejecting mechanisms.”143 
The problem is also not uniquely “Western” however: our Asian colleagues also 
often define the significance of their careers and their work in terms of 
participation in national professional hierarchies and networks and have little 
time or energy for negotiating a new set of foreign relationships. Meridian 180’s 
members experience constant misunderstandings about what one another 
conceive of as a live theoretical question, and they routinely lack the 
professional tools or intellectual handles for appreciating novelty in one 
another’s work. 
The generation of interest in things foreign has long been an 
underacknowledged yet constant purpose of comparative legal studies. And yet 
generating such an interest among legal academics and the thinking public at 
large was a passion—a mission, even—of many of the great postwar 
comparatists.144 Today, as then, we need more subtle, creative, and careful genres 
 
 142. See P2P FOUNDATION, supra note 5, at 58 (quoting Chris Anderson’s claim that amateurs 
“choose to spend their time on what they do, and they go exactly where their passions, interests, 
knowledge and personality takes them—no further. If they lose interest they move on and are replaced 
by someone bursting with fresh energy”). 
 143. See CHIBA, supra note 67, at 46. 
 144. See, e.g., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, PETER E. HERZOG & EDWARD M. 
WISE, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS (1970). Ugo Mattei captures one example of 
this excitement in his exposition of Rudolf Schlesinger’s Cornell Common Core Project: 
Schlesinger has been a creative and influential innovator. In the early sixties, at Cornell, he 
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of empathy and intellectual appreciation across national boundaries, 
disciplinary boundaries, and the boundary between the academy and the 
professions. What if the central problem of comparative law shifted from how to 
describe foreign legal systems to how to elucidate interest, commitment, and 
response to things foreign and unfamiliar? What if comparative lawyers were 
seriously to experiment with the techniques for creating empathy and interest in 
things foreign? Ironically, such a focus would have very direct relevance, in 
many areas in which comparative law prides itself on having an impact, from 
transnational business relations, to international movements for social change, 
to cooperative arrangements between national regulators in international 
affairs, to relations among academic institutions. In the postwar era, interest was 
produced through the aesthetic techniques of pluralism. Yet how is interest 
produced today, after the collapse of comparison, of sameness and difference, of 
culture, and of globalization? Here is a serious scholarly question. 
Meridian 180 has not by any means unlocked the formula for generating 
interest in otherness. But the controlled fiction of collaboration has allowed us 
to closely observe the process of persons becoming interested. Most members 
start off with little commitment to the project. Most commonly, they sign on 
because of a personal relationship to another member, and with no intention of 
giving the discussions more than a glance every once in a while. They cannot see 
how this project could be useful to them. We make the barrier to initial 
commitment high by emphasizing again and again—in violation of management 
consultants’ number one rule that one must show people “what is in the 
organization for them”—that they will gain nothing at all from their 
involvement—neither visibility nor prestige nor income. New participants are 
also typically troubled by the lack of “outputs” or “deliverables.” This all seems 
like talk for talk’s sake. 
Sometimes, somehow, this changes. Perhaps a new member decides to 
intervene in an online conversation—something that they usually experience as 
risky and anxiety producing.145 Do they have anything worthy to contribute to 
the conversation? How will their views be received by such an illustrious but 
diverse membership? Once someone takes such a risk, he or she usually feels 
committed in some sense to see how that risk will play out, and perhaps also 
becomes more empathetic toward and curious about other people’s risky moves. 
Or sometimes the risk entails just spending the time (a professional’s most 
valuable resource) to read through the dense and often difficult online 
discussions. And perhaps the individual in question discovers something 
 
launched and carried out, with exceptional organizational and fundraising skills, a collective 
enterprise, known as the Cornell Common Core Project whose results have been published in 
two monumental volumes on the issue of the formation of contracts.  
See Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Jurisprudence of Schlesinger and Sacco, in RETHINKING THE 
MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 11, at 243. 
 145. RABINOW, supra note 94, at 203 (noting “willingness to take risk is the parameter of our 
discussion”). 
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surprising or unexpected through this reading, such that the interest feeds itself 
further. 
Of course plenty of others never become interested at all. But what people 
mention in retrospect is that this process of becoming interested is in some way 
self-transformative, and becomes meaningful purely on that basis. It also 
becomes the catalyst for further action: a scholar resolves for the first time to 
attend academic conferences overseas, or a government bureaucrat sees new 
intellectual value in his mundane day to day work. Here the challenge of 
interest links to the second sense of challenge in Chiba’s work—self-challenge 
as a technique of self-cultivation. 
B. Transforming Value 
This focus on transformations in participants’ own subjectivity may seem 
quite far from the transformations in the nature of economic value in the global 
economy with which we began. Remember that for all its seeming novelty, the 
collaborative economy is actually premised on a very old fashioned idea of 
economic value as organizing purpose and with it, a simple notion of human 
motivation. Is there an alternative kind of value being produced in this project 
then? If so, that would be a quite transformative response to the rise of the 
collaborative economy indeed. 
It may be useful to think about this question by way of analogy to another 
global sharing economy, the renowned Kula exchange of valuable objects 
among inhabitants of islands separated by hundreds of miles,146 as studied by 
another feminist anthropologist, Nancy Munn.147 Based on fieldwork among the 
Massim people, one group of participants in the Kula network, Munn describes 
how the exchange of words, objects, and persons, both among neighbors and 
with the inhabitants of far-away islands, engenders transformations of “space-
time” not entirely unlike the way a cell phone application brings users from far 
away places into collaborative proximity. The gift of a canoe literally brings far 
away places into close proximity while the gift of cooked food to the kin of 
one’s daughter brings events from the past into present memory and hopes for 
the future into present consciousness. 
Yet for Munn, the issue in these local and global exchanges is not the 
production or addition of value, as it is in the more standard definitions of the 
collaborative economy explored in part II, but rather the transformation of 
value in the context of the obligations of reciprocity that gifts engender. She 
documents how, for example, a gift of cooked food (one kind of value) 
 
 146.  See, e.g., FRANCESCA MERLAN & ALAN RUMSEY, KU WARU: LANGUAGE AND 
SEGMENTARY POLITICS IN THE WESTERN NEBILYER VALLEY, PAPUA NEW GUINEA (1991); Nancy 
Munn, Constructing Regional Worlds in Experience: Kula Exchange, Witchcraft and Gawan Local 
Events, 25 MAN 1 (1990); Andrew Strathern, Gender, Ideology and Money in Mount Hagen, 14 MAN 
530 (1979); STRATHERN, THE GENDER IN THE GIFT, supra note 49. 
 147. NANCY MUNN, THE FAME OF GAWA: A SYMBOLIC STUDY OF VALUE TRANSFORMATION IN 
A MASSIN SOCIETY (1992). 
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transforms into contributions of labor in the building of canoes (another kind of 
value), which in turn transforms into a canoe which is presented to one group’s 
affines to satisfy prior marriage-related debts, then passed on by the canoe’s 
receivers to their own affines to satisfy other prior debts, and finally placed into 
service as a means of transportation to far away islands where further episodes 
of gift exchange await.148 For Munn, value is better conceived as the 
transformation of “space-times” of interaction, obligation, and memory.149 In 
these exchanges, Munn argues, the relative value of an action is determined by 
the extent to which it extends its own space-time. For example, an exchange of 
gifts in the context of a marriage ceremony sets in motion a series of further 
exchanges and relations that last for the lifetime of the married couple and 
beyond, while the complex interisland circulation of valuables in patterns of 
generalized exchange create a space-time of global proportions.150 The efficacy 
and identity of Kula exchange inheres not in some clear and shared purpose or 
value to which all contribute but rather in the way one kind of value is endlessly 
transformed into another, and the social relations that ensue. 
The conditions of the present on which we experiment collectively are, as I 
have already suggested earlier, economic conditions in which the nature of 
value itself is not a given but is undergoing profound transformation. As Munn 
suggests, the seeming expansion of space-times experienced within 
collaborative projects such as Meridian 180 is in fact an effect of 
transformations in the very nature of economic value, after the collapse of price 
as the primary tool of value coordination. In Meridian 180, we are participating 
in this transformation, in an experimental sense, by transforming value of our 
own. 
Munn’s ethnography is particularly relevant on one point: she notices that 
transformations of “space-time”—transformations, aggrandizements of value—
are always accompanied by transformations of the self. Bodies become stronger 
or weaker, persons become more energetic or more sleepy, as they engage in 
 
 148.  See id. at 17. Munn writes: 
[C]ertain media—in particular, the body and other important elements (such as Gawan canoes 
and kula shells, which can be shown to have bodily and anthropomorphic associations in 
Gawan symbolism)—exhibit qualisigns of the positive or negative value generated by acts, 
notably by acts of food transmission (and other acts involving constraints on eating) and 
consumption. 
Id. 
 149.  See Nancy Munn, The Cultural Anthropology of Time: A Critical Essay, 21 ANN. REV. OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY 93, 107 (1992) (“[T]hrough the body’s immersion in activity rhythms (including 
verbal action) it becomes imbued with ‘a whole relationship to time.’ Spatiotemporality is thus 
constituted as part of the actor’s habitus, held in bodily memory.”). 
 150.  See MUNN, supra note 147, at 122–23. 
The spatiotemporal transformation initiated by the cooked food gift (and its immediate 
payment) thus brings into being long-term cyclic exchanges that are expected to last as long as 
the marriage (whether terminated by divorce or the death of one of the spouses), or until the 
death of one of the partners to the exchange. 
Id. 
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such transformations.151 Perhaps this discovery makes the focus, within Meridian 
180, on becoming interested a little less absurd. To say that we value our own 
collective interest in the project, then, is recursive but quite apposite to the 
extent that value transformation is, as Munn argues, also self-transformation. 
Rabinow makes this explicit when he claims that collaborative fieldwork must 
also entail “transformative work on the self.”152 
The seemingly trivial experience of Meridian 180 as a long list of to-dos is 
indicative of something feminists have long understood: the constitutive quality 
of collaboration. Scholarship in the modality of collaboration is not simply 
description in the service of law-building done elsewhere, by others, in another 
space-time so to speak. Rather, collaboration becomes its own kind of 
constitutional moment, a different form of politics—one that is constitutive of a 
new set of ethical, social, political, and institutional relations, albeit one deeply 
implicated in the economics of the moment, just as pluralism was for a previous 
generation. 
The challenge of comparative legal studies once inhered in gathering 
information, knowing and understanding foreign legal institutions, and then 
writing about things foreign from the perspective of domestic law. The challenge 
for an era of collaboration, in contrast, is a far more dangerous but also 
transformative one: to stage challenges that transform value by producing 
change in the nature of the interlocutors—transformations of the self. In such 
projects, intellectual adventure, vocation, and political action come together 
once again, in a different way. All three are on the “inside,” so to speak. The 
policy world is not something we “impact” with our outputs; its members are 
already within, with all the challenges that ensue. Description and theorizing 
come together also in the conversations and the endless institutional and social 
scaffolding work that sustains them. Most of all, we find in the risks of this 
exchange a transformative power—a power of collective self-transformation. 
 
 151.  See id. at 74. 
[Gawans] envision consumption as producing nothing but sleep, a bodily state that the 
speaker contrasted with the kula shells and fame producible through the overseas 
transmission of food. On the face of it, this comment connecting eating and sleeping may seem 
unremarkable . . . . [H]owever it reflects an underlying nexus of meanings that are important 
in understanding value transformation on Gawa. 
Id. 
 152.  RABINOW, supra note 94. 
